Active Directory Lateral Movement
Lateral movement in AD is the loop of find a target → authenticate → execute across machines, escalating toward tier-0 assets. MITRE ATT&CK tracks it under the Lateral Movement tactic (TA0008); the dominant built-in transport is WinRM / PowerShell Remoting — 1 — because it is legitimate management infrastructure, enabled by default on Windows Server, and blends with admin traffic.
The basic loop
- Locate: where are privileged sessions and where do you have local admin?
PowerView answers both:
Find-LocalAdminAccess -Verbose # machines where current user has local admin Invoke-UserHunter # where Domain Admins are logged in - Authenticate: plaintext creds, pass-the-hash, Kerberos tickets (pass-the-ticket), or ACL abuse to reset your way in.
- Execute: one of the transports below.
WinRM / PowerShell Remoting (T1021.006)
# Interactive session
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName $COMPUTER
# Stateful session (reusable, fewer auth events)
$SESSION = New-PSSession -ComputerName $COMPUTER
Enter-PSSession -Session $SESSION
# One-shot command execution (fan-out capable)
Invoke-Command -ComputerName $COMPUTER -ScriptBlock { $COMMAND }
# Run a LOCAL script on the remote machine
Invoke-Command -FilePath $SCRIPT_PATH -ComputerName $COMPUTER
# Run a LOCAL function remotely (arguments append as usual)
Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock ${function:$FUNCTION} -ComputerName $COMPUTERInvoke-Command against a list of hosts executes in parallel — administrators
use it for fleet management, attackers for fleet-wide credential harvesting.
WinRM listens on 5985/5986; non-default ports and SOAP-over-HTTP make it
distinguishable from web traffic, but in environments that already manage with
PowerShell it hides in the noise.
Transport comparison
| Transport | MITRE | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| WinRM / PSRemoting | T1021.006 | Full PowerShell; evil-winrm adds PtH + upload/download from Linux |
| SMB admin shares + PsExec-style service | T1021.002 | Noisy (service install events 7045/4697) |
| [[wmi-remote-service-execution | WMI]] | T1047 |
| RDP | T1021.001 | Interactive; restricted-admin mode enables PtH (xfreerdp) |
| DCOM | T1021.003 | MMC20.Application, ShellWindows — semi-fileless |
| WinRS | T1021.006 | winrs cmd over the same WinRM channel |
Credential reuse patterns chain from credential access: mimikatz LSASS dumps feed NTLM pass-the-hash into WinRM/SMB; Kerberos material feeds pass-the-ticket via rubeus or impacket.
Detection
- Event 4624 type 3/10 from unexpected sources; Event 5985/5986 listeners and WinRM 91/168 shell lifecycle events.
- PowerShell script-block logging (4104) catches
Invoke-Commandpayloads even over the wire (they land as script on the target). - Baseline which admin accounts should fan out — a workstation account touching 50 hosts in a minute is the loudest lateral-movement signature there is.
Sources
Related: powerview, ntlm-hashes, evil-winrm, mimikatz, wmi-remote-service-execution, active-directory-weak-permissions, active-directory-trust-pivoting, golden-and-silver-ticket-attacks, rubeus, impacket.