Open Access Order

A social order in which access to organizations — political, economic, and social — is open to all citizens who meet a set of minimal and impersonal criteria, rather than being limited to members of a dominant coalition. The concept, developed by Douglass North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry Weingast in Violence and Social Orders (2009), distinguishes two fundamental ways societies solve the problem of violence: the limited-access order (or “natural state”) and the open-access order. ¹

The Two Orders

Limited-access order (natural state): The dominant form of social organization for most of recorded history. A coalition of elites with access to violence agrees to limit entry into valuable activities, creating rents that bind coalition members to cooperate rather than fight. Personal relationships among the elite form the basis for political organization; people outside the coalition have only limited access to organizations, privileges, and valuable resources. Rent-creation through limited access is not merely corruption — it is the essential means of controlling violence in a society without impersonal institutions. ²

Open-access order: Emerged in the nineteenth century. Identity becomes defined by impersonal characteristics (“citizens”) rather than personal relationships. The ability to form organizations that society supports is open to everyone who meets minimal, impersonal criteria. Open access in politics requires open access in economics, and vice versa — neither can be sustained without the other. ³

Key Mechanisms

• Impersonality: The central feature. The same conditions apply regardless of who you are or whether officials admire your proposed use. The state is not necessarily laissez-faire, but its role ends once you have complied with impersonal rules. ⁴
• Double balance: Open access in the economy supports open access in politics, and vice versa. Creative destruction in both spheres prevents the solidification of advantage through rent-creation. ⁵
• Adaptive efficiency: Open-access orders are better at generating new ideas and discarding bad ones in the face of shocks. This explains why rich countries are not distinguished by higher growth rates but by fewer and shallower episodes of negative growth. ⁶

The Transition

The transition from natural state to open-access order is neither automatic nor inevitable. North et al. identify three doorstep conditions that must develop within a natural state before transition becomes possible:

1. Rule of law for elites — impersonal legal relationships among the elite themselves
2. Perpetually lived organizations — public and private organizations whose existence is independent of their members’ lives
3. Consolidated political control of the military — removing the need for elites to maintain alliances with military factions

Once these conditions exist, elites may find it in their self-interest to transform personal privileges into impersonal rights — and eventually to expand access beyond the elite. ⁷

Implications for Democracy

Elections work differently in natural states than in open-access orders. In natural states, elections often serve as mechanisms of control — public goods are delivered personally, and officials can threaten to withhold them. In open-access orders, impersonal delivery of public goods prevents this manipulation. Democracy requires not just elections but the full institutional environment of open access: competitive party systems, a free press, and open entry into economic and political organization. ⁸

Application: Data Centers as the Natural State Returning

Alex Tabarrok applies the framework to the data-center-backlash: the US data-center permitting process — rezoning, special-use permits, negotiated community benefits agreements, public comment — is not a set of general rules but a series of terms of admission negotiated with whoever holds the veto. “The natural state returns,” Tabarrok argues, when access to economic activity must be bargained for in the collective sphere rather than being available under impersonal rules. The same logic applies to both special subsidies and special burdens: both replace general rules with judgments about whether a particular industry deserves to exist. ⁹

Critiques and Tensions

Arnold Kling notes that open-access orders may drift toward natural-state characteristics as entrenched interests use regulation to thwart competition — taxi companies vs. ride-sharing, teachers’ unions vs. charter schools. The extent of rent-creation in modern US society (large banks, public-sector unions, regulated professions) may be larger than North et al. suggest, though Kling stops short of saying the US has fallen back into the natural state. ¹⁰

Related Concepts

• data-center-backlash — the immediate political context where Tabarrok applies the framework
• ostrom-design-principles — complementary framework for commons governance; both deal with how groups manage access to resources
• trust-and-social-capital — the social-capital prerequisites for impersonal institutions
• competitive-rent-extraction — how firms compete while jointly extracting rents; the open-access framework explains why some rent-creation persists even in open societies
• moral-economy-price-tag — the tension between impersonal market rules and community moral economies

Sources

• Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Barry R. Weingast 2009 — Violence and the Rise of Open-Access Orders
• Alex Tabarrok 2026 — Data Centers and the Open Access Order
• Arnold Kling 2015 — The Two Forms of Social Order

Footnotes

1. Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Barry R. Weingast 2009 — Violence and the Rise of Open-Access Orders ↩

2. Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Barry R. Weingast 2009 — Violence and the Rise of Open-Access Orders ↩

3. Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Barry R. Weingast 2009 — Violence and the Rise of Open-Access Orders ↩

4. Alex Tabarrok 2026 — Data Centers and the Open Access Order ↩

5. Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Barry R. Weingast 2009 — Violence and the Rise of Open-Access Orders ↩

6. Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Barry R. Weingast 2009 — Violence and the Rise of Open-Access Orders ↩

7. Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Barry R. Weingast 2009 — Violence and the Rise of Open-Access Orders ↩

8. Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Barry R. Weingast 2009 — Violence and the Rise of Open-Access Orders ↩

9. Alex Tabarrok 2026 — Data Centers and the Open Access Order ↩

10. Arnold Kling 2015 — The Two Forms of Social Order ↩