Norms

Social rules that govern behavior through expectation and informal enforcement rather than formal law. In evolutionary-game-theory, norms are modeled as patterns of behavior sustained by punishment of defection.

Axelrod’s Model

robert-axelrod modeled norms using two dimensions: boldness (willingness to defect) and vengefulness (willingness to punish observed defectors). Key findings: 1

  1. Norms are inherently fragile without enforcement. Vengefulness decays because punishing carries cost with no direct return, leading to norm collapse.
  2. metanorms — punishing non-punishers — create self-reinforcing systems where vengefulness rises and boldness collapses into stable norms.
  3. Dominance can establish norms. Groups with greater numbers, economic/political power, or more frequent interactions impose norms asymmetrically.

Cross-Domain Connections

  • Cybersecurity: Security culture (“see something, say something”) is a norm that requires enforcement to be stable. Axelrod’s metanorm model suggests that organizations where reporting is itself rewarded/enforced are far more robust.
  • organizational-behavior: Corporate culture is essentially a set of norms. The fragility of norms without enforcement explains why “tone from the top” matters.
  • blockchain: Protocol governance relies on norm-like behavior among participants (e.g., honest mining, participation in governance votes).

See Also

Sources

Footnotes

  1. 1986